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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Comment was not hand written with charcoal on animal skin
or even with ink on paper; instead, it was written using state-of-the-art
word-processing software operating on state-of-the-art computer
hardware. Neither the software nor the hardware arrived fully formed
from the mind of a single person. Each is a years-long cumulation of a
series of technological advances. Probably, a few of these advances
were fundamental, most were incremental-all were essential to making the final product what it is today.
The mechanics of creating and editing a work such as this Comment
are much simpler today than it would have been even twenty years
ago, when personal computers and easy-to-use word-processing
software were virtually nonexistent. In the early 1980s, each version
of this paper would likely have been a single-font, typewriter-produced paper copy. Subsequent edited versions would have been
retyped from the beginning. In the early 1990s, each paper copy may
have been produced by a dedicated electronic word-processing machine with a two- or three-line display. Edits would have been made
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in the electronic copy and new versions printed to paper. Today, this
Comment can be easily produced, edited, and submitted in a purely
electronic format-never reaching paper until published in a print
medium.
There are innumerable other examples of recently developed technology which have eased many aspects of the average American's life.
One only has to look in the kitchen to see labor-reducing appliances
not available at the turn of the last century; or in the hospital to see
life-saving equipment and medicine only recently available; or in the
garage to see automobile safety features Henry Ford would not have
dreamed possible.
While the impact of technological advancement on our individual
lives is immense, it also has a profound impact on our economy. As
food production and distribution has become more efficient, societal
resources have been freed to expend on manufacturing. As manufacturing has become more efficient, societal resources have been freed
to expend on creation and manipulation of information. We have become prolific inventors and innovators and, in so doing, we have created an economy dependent on invention and innovation.
Because of the rate at which newly created technology is introduced, we may be tempted to assume that not only is the technology
to be expected-i.e., it is not truly inventive-but also that the entire
process of invention is as simple as the mechanics involved. Just as
the creation of this Comment was much more difficult than typing,
editing, and emailing it to the publisher, the creation of the wordprocessing software used was more difficult than typing, editing, and
distributing the code.
While our prolific technological advancement may have created an
expectation of invention, it has also created a need for continual invention. The commonality of labor-saving devices has increased our
reliance on those devices and the energy necessary to drive them.
Similarly, life-extending instruments and medicine have revealed the
effects of diseases that were before either unknown or unlikely, further creating a need for life-saving technology that was before
unnecessary.
Our need for continual invention can be met only by expending resources on invention. Under the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution,' Congress has the power to enact laws to stimulate the
expenditure of individual and social resources on technological innovation. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 Here, "Science" refers
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
2. Id.
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to the total knowledge base, and "useful Arts" refers to technology.3
From the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress has created a copy-

right system to promote the progress of science and a patent system to
promote the progress of technology.4

Recently, it has been argued that the U.S. patent system is broken
and has become a social burden, merely serving to grant unnecessary
economic monopolies at the expense of consumers without creating
an extra incentive to invent; or worse, that the patent system actually
reduces incentive to invent.5 These critics contend that, in effect, the

patent system functions as both a short- and long-run economic burden on society. 6 The result has been a strong effort to reduce the
extent of patent
rights at both the legislative and judicial branches of
7
government.
Some of the proposed reforms, and the policies on which they are
based, favor short-run consumer benefits over the long-run goal of

continued American invention. These reforms have the potential to
lessen the United States' position as a world economic and technological leader.

A brief model of the economics of invention is presented in Section
II of this Comment. In Section Ill, several aspects of the patent sys-

tem that serve as incentive to invent are described. Specific common
critiques of the patent system are presented in Section IV, along with
the proposed reforms and an analysis of their effects on the incentive

to invent.
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF INVENTION

The act of inventing is comprised of forming an idea with a practical
application and reducing the idea to practice.8 It has been broadly
3. See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 756 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
5. See, e.g., American Innovation at Risk: The Case for Patent Reform, Oversight
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9-15 (2007) [hereinafter Jaffe Hearing] (testimony of Adam B. Jaffe, Prof. of Economics), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
media/pdfs/printers/l10th/33315.pdf; see American Innovation at Risk: The Case for
Patent Reform: Oversight Hearing on the Patent System Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 1-4 (2007) (testimony of Daniel B. Ravicher, Exec. Dir. Public Patent Foundation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ravicher0702l5.pdf.
6. See Jaffe Hearing, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (broadening the
definition of obviousness); S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing limitations on remedies available for infringement).
8. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 87 (1999).
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defined as the production of information. 9 The term "invention" has
been specifically defined as the "creation of a new product or process."'" The related term "innovation" has been specifically defined
1 Colas the "successful introduction and adoption of [an invention].""
12
development.
product
is
lectively, invention and innovation
Successfully inventing is primarily a function of access to, and manipulation of, information.1 3 Where others have derived and published the relevant information, the inventor may find it in the public
domain. 4 If access to information in the public domain is too costly,
the inventor may also derive such information independently by creating new, duplicating existing, or recreating lost information through
exercising her skills and talents.' 5
A.

Product Development

Product development is the process by which: a market opportunity
is recognized, a product is created to exploit that opportunity, and the
product is produced and sold in the market. 6 The typical productdevelopment process consists of six stages: (1) planning; (2) concept
development; (3) system-level design; (4) detail design; (5) testing and
refinement; and (6) the ramp-up to production.' The first and second
stages comprise the invention process; the subsequent stages comprise
the innovation process. 8
In the planning stage, the existence and potential size of the market
opportunity are estimated; as are the technical, time, and financial
constraints on the creation and production of the product.' 9 Where
more than one opportunity exists and resources are finite, the opportunities must be prioritized. 20 Resources are assigned to exploit the
highest-priority opportunities. 2 a If the result of the planning stage so
9. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616 (1962).

10. See JAMES D.

GWARTNEY

&

RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND

PUBLIC CHOICE 41 (7th ed. 1995).

11. See id.
12. See KARL T. ULRICH & STEVEN D. EPPINGER, PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (3d ed. 2004).
13. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997).
14. See ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 104-07.
15. See id. at 107-10.
16. Id. at 2 (defining a product as "something sold by an enterprise to its
customers").
17. Id. at 13-15.
18. See ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 13-15. See generally GWARTNEY
& STROUP, supra note 10, at 41 (discussing the relationship between invention and
innovation).
19. See ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 34-35, 39, 42-45, 48.
20. Id. at 38, 43-45.
21. Id.
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warrants, the process enters the concept development stage in which
the product is specified,2 2 the target cost is estimated,2 3 suitable technologies are found or created,24 and early prototypes are tested.2 5
The four stages of the development process subsequent to the invention are related to producing and selling the product-the innovation.26 In these latter stages, the development is focused on ensuring
that the product can be efficiently produced and delivered to the
market.27
At every stage in the product's development, the decision to proceed is based on an economic evaluation of projected revenues and
costs-numbers fraught with uncertainty.2 8 To continue the development process, the projected revenues must sufficiently exceed the projected costs. 29 Because economic analyses performed in the early
stages of product development, i.e., the inventive stages, involve more
speculation than the latter-stage analyses, the uncertainty is greater in
the early stages.3 °
To invest resources into inventing, an inventor must estimate the
future invention's present value to be sufficiently greater than the sum
of the future costs of inventing (CI), and innovating (manufacturing
and marketing) (CM). 3 For the profit-motivated inventor, the net present value of the contemplated invention (NPV), is a function of: the
probability of successfully developing the product (P), the expected
by the product (ER), and the expected future costs
revenue generated
32
(CI + CM):

NPV = [P x ER - (C1 + CM)].
Thus, the greater the costs or the lower the probability of success,
the greater the expected revenues need be to warrant investment.
22. Id. at 54, 72-83.
23. See id. at 86-88, 94-96.
24. See id. at 98-100, 124-29.
25. See id. at 146-47.
26. See id. at 14-15.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 308-11, 328-30. See generally id. at 312-19 (providing an overview
of the economic analysis method for estimating the NPV and the factors that affect
such an estimate).
29. See generally id. at 308-19 (providing an overview of the economic analysis
method for estimating the NPV and the factors that affect such an estimate).
30. Id.
31. See generally id. at 309, 312-13 (discussing and demonstrating the importance
of NPV computation in determining major investment decisions).
32. See id. at 329-30. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 10-11 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the concepts of value, utility, and efficiency,
and how such concepts apply in the calculation of both expected costs and benefits).
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The Cost of Invention

The cost of inventing is the lost opportunity of expending the required resources in the next-best way.33 For example, inventing the
integrated circuit required a certain investment of capital and human
resources. Those resources could have instead been used to support
or expand the transistor market.3 4 The cost of inventing the integrated circuit included the lost opportunity to realize the value of expanding the transistor market.
This opportunity cost is reflected in present-day valuation of future
costs through adoption of a time-dependent value of resources. 35 Projected future costs (C+CM) and revenues (ER) are discounted by
some rate (the discount rate, r) that corresponds to the opportunity
cost over time (t). 36 Thus, in the NPV equation,

(C,

+ CM)

=

(C,

+ CM) projected

(1 + r)'

Inventing is the creation of new information, and creating new information requires the manipulation of existing information. Thus,
the cost of inventing is primarily the cost of accessing, using, and creating information.3" Facilitating access to information will lower the
cost of invention, while restricting use of the information will increase
the cost of invention.38
From the prospective view of the inventor, the future cost of inventing is a fixed cost, i.e., it is neither variable with the quantity of
output nor yet a sunk cost. 39 Thus, the decision to invent involves
weighing the expected revenues from the invention against the expected costs of inventing.4n
33. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 5-6 (distinguishing resources from money,
which is merely a "claim on resources").
34. See Michael Riordan, How Bell Labs Missed the Microchip, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Dec. 2006, at 37, 40 (describing the situation in which spending their finite resources
on transistor development cost Bell Labs the opportunity to develop the integrated
circuit).
35. See ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 325-28.
36. See id. at 327.
37. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 997.
38. See id.
39. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 23-24 (2003). See generally GWARTNEY &
STROUP, supra note 10, at 508, 532 (defining "fixed cost"); POSNER, supra note 32, at
7 (defining "sunk cost").
40. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 7 (stating that "'Sunk' ... costs do not affect a
rational actor's decisions").
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C. Revenue from the Invention
An invention can generate revenue for the inventor in various
ways. 4 1 For example, the inventor's professional standing, sense of
self-worth, or happiness may be enhanced. The inventor may also receive a direct pecuniary benefit by perfecting and selling the product
that incorporates the invention or from selling the right to use the
invention.42 Where the revenue comes from selling the right to use
the invention, the invention itself becomes the inventor's developed
product.
In a market economy, demand for a product is inversely related to
the price; 43 therefore, revenue generated is proportional to the demand for the invention. For example, the demand for integrated circuits is large. The pecuniary revenue generated by the integrated
circuit in 2005 alone, forty-seven years after its invention, was $193
billion. 44 Additionally, the revenue generated by the invention included a National Medal 47of Science, 45 a National Medal of Technology, 46 and a Nobel Prize.
Opportunity costs are also reflected in the time-dependent value of
future revenues. 48 The expected future revenue (ER) is discounted at
rate r, reflecting its devaluation with time (t). 4 9 Thus, in the NPV
equation,
ER

-

ERprojeced

(1 + r),

D. Risk Aversion of the Inventor
Risk has been defined as an "exposure to a proposition of which
one is uncertain."5 ° More simply stated, risk is "a chance of things not
turning out as expected."' 5 1 Risk is a function of uncertainty.
41. See Arrow, supra note 9, at 614, 624.
42. See H. JACKSON KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH MANAGERS 41, 63 (2d ed. 2001).
43. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 5.
44. Texas Instruments, Jack St. Clair Kilby: About Jack, http://www.ti.com/corp/
docs/kilbyctr/jackstclair.shtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
45. 1969 Award Winners Listed, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 21, 1970, at 5
(recording the award to Jack Kilby in 1969).
46. Technology Admin., The National Medal of Technology Recipients, http://
www.technology.gov/medalRecipients.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (noting the
award to Jack Kilby in 1990).
47. Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Prize in Physics 2000, http://nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/physics/laureates/2000/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
48. See ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 325-28.
49. See id.
50. Glyn A. Holton, Defining Risk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 2004, 19, 22.
51. Economist.com, Research Tools: Economics A-Z, http://www.economist.com/
research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=R (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
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General economic theory holds that the greater the risk, the greater
must be the expected return to warrant investment. 52 Thus, in choosing between two investments, the first involving a higher risk than the
second, the investor would choose the first only if its expected return
was sufficiently higher than the second's expected return. 53 The investor's risk aversion (RA) is subjective and typically lowers the incentive to invest (i.e., RA < 1, where RA=1 defines a risk neutral
investor).
In product development, the greater the uncertainty in the NPV parameters-P, ER, CI, and CM-the more difficult it is to determine the
expected result-the NPV. Thus, the incentive to invent (INC) is a
product of the NPV and the investing inventor's risk aversion (RA):
INC = NPV x RA.

Because early-stage NPV estimates are inherently less certain than
latter-stage estimates, 54 early-stage decisions involve more risk and
thus require a greater expected return-a larger NPV-to warrant
investment.
E.

The Incentive to Invent

The maximum profit the inventor may receive is when the marginal
revenue from the invention (the rate of change of revenue with quantity sold) is equal to the marginal cost of production (the cost of proIn a perfectly competitive market in
ducing one more sale).
equilibrium (where the inventor controls the amount she produces but
not the price of the product), the marginal revenue equals the price of
the invention, and the price of the invention is equal to the highest
marginal cost amongst the competitors.56 Where she has a monopoly,
the inventor can affect the price of the invention by varying the quantity produced; if she is able to exploit the variance of demand with
respect to price, 57she can realize greater profits than in a perfectly competitive market.
The NPV parameters will vary depending on how the inventor attempts to realize revenue from her investment. The early-stage NPV
estimate will be less certain for development processes with more
complex latter stages. For example, planning to enter the market as a
52. See id.
53. Complex models of economic behavior under uncertainty, such as the Cumulative Prospect Theory or the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Model, are beyond
the scope of this comment.
54. See generally ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 308-09 (providing an
overview of the economic analysis method for estimating the NPV and the factors
that affect such an estimate).
55. GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 10, at 532.
56. See id. at 531-34; POSNER, supra note 32, at 8-9.
57. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 10, at 558-65; POSNER, supra note 32,
at 279-83.
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manufacturer or service provider likely entails greater projected costs
and greater uncertainty than planning to sell the rights to the invention at the completion of the product development's invention stage.5 8
Because entering the market with copies of the invention is a higher
risk proposition than selling the rights to the invention, the expected
NPV must be greater to warrant such investment.
1. Competitive Market
A free-rider situation arises if the inventor's competitors are able to
practice the invention equally with the inventor.5 9 In this scenario, the
inventor bears the fixed costs of inventing but is subject to market
pricing-based on marginal production costs-for the output of the
invention.6" Therefore, an inventor competing in such a market must
rely on lower marginal costs than her competitors in order to recoup
her fixed costs, costs her competitors have not incurred.6 1 Also, because competitors may freely practice the invention, the inventor does
not have the option to sell rights to the invention and must enter the
competitive market to recover the costs of inventing. In such a market, the incentive is not to invent but to lower costs of production, an
incentive that exists independent of any incentive to invent.6 2
In this scenario, because there is no market for the invention separate from the product that incorporates it, the NPV of the invention
considered separately from the product is negative. The decision to
invent must therefore be based on a complete product-development
process-invention and innovation-a higher risk prospect than invention alone.
2.

Inventor-Controlled Market

If the inventor is introducing an invention for which there are no
then-existing substitutes, 63 she may use the first-to-market advantage
to reap profits prior to competition arising and to establish an advantageous market position with brand recognition. 64 Relying on being
the first to market with the invention in order to recoup investment
58. See generally ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 308-19 (providing an
overview of the economic analysis method for estimating the NPV and the factors
that affect such an estimate).
59. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTErrs 8
(2004); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 23-24 (2003).
60. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 22-24.
61. See POSNER, supra note 32, at 10.
62. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 10, at 550. See generally ULRICH &
EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 308-19 (providing an overview of the economic analysis
method for estimating the NPV, a method that enables analysis of production costs).
63. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 10, at 470 (defining a substitute for the
invention as a product for which the demand will rise as the price of the invention
rises).
64. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PROCS. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI. 1252, 1254 (2005).
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will likely require increased costs to initially establish and meet consumer demand prior to competitors entering the market.6 5 Efficient

fast followers, those firms who enter the market soon after its establishment, may minimize profits that result from the first-to-market
advantage.6 6

If the nature of the invention allows, the inventor may choose to

keep her invention secret and prolong the first-to-market advantage.6 7

Keeping a trade secret requires expending resources on maintaining
secrecy and thus increases the product development costs. 68 Profiting
from trade secrecy is limited to the extent that the secret can be
kept. 69 The secret information embodied in certain inventions can
often be revealed through reverse engineering, a process by which a
competitor can discover the information by examining the invention.7 °
Reverse engineering "reduces development costs and eases market
entry" by allowing the competitor to capitalize on the prior efforts of
the inventor. 7 ' Further, failure to publicly disclose the secret may ac-

tually hinder the first inventor if a subsequent independent inventor
secures patent protection.7 2

Another way the inventor may prolong the first-to-market advantage is a government grant to the exclusive rights to the invention for
a limited time-a patent.7 3 Prosecuting, maintaining, licensing, and
enforcing a patent will increase the inventor's costs.71 In addition, the

inventor must disclose the invention to the public in such detail that
65. See

MICHAEL

E.

MCGRATH, PRODUCT STRATEGY FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY

COMPANIES 230 (2d ed. 2001) ("New markets.., must be educated. This is an expen-

sive process, and its costs are usually borne by the first company to market."). See
generally ULRICH & EPPINGER, supra note 12, at 308-319 (providing an overview of
the economic analysis method for estimating the NPV and the factors that affect such
an estimate).
66. See McGRATH, supra note 65, at 230-31 ("Fast-follower strategies can be particularly successful in new markets created by advances in technology, since nobody
really knows how customers will eventually use the product or what they will
prefer.").
67. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 356-59.
68. See id. at 357, 360.
69. See Vincenzo Denicol6 & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 365, 369 (2003).
70. Terry Ludlow, Judicial Support for Semiconductor Reverse Engineering, IPL
NEWSL (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law), Fall 2006, at 1; see McGRATH,
supra note 65, at 231.
71. See McGRATH, supra note 65, at 231.
72. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 358, 360-61.
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
74. See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., IPWatchdog.com, Cost of Obtaining a Patent,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent-cost.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007); Eugene R.
Quinn, Jr., IPWatchdog, Cost of Obtaining a Patent, Maintenance Fees, http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/maintenancefees.htmi (last visited Sept. 15, 2007); see Bruce
Berman, Patent Litigation Costs, iPFRONTLINE.COM, Sept. 18, 2002, http://
www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=627&deptid=4.
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competitors will be able to practice the invention or invent a substitute with minimal research costs and negligible risk.
While the temporary market control gained by being the first-tomarket may increase the expected revenues, it also may increase the
expected costs. Additionally, there exists increased uncertainty in the
NPV in that the duration and effectiveness of the market control, as
well as the size of the market, are not well-defined in a first-to-market
scenario. Thus, the NPV may be greater for a first-to-market plan
than for a plan to enter a competitive market, but so too is the risk.
Risk is reduced by decreased uncertainty in the duration and effectiveness of the market control. It is also reduced by decreased uncertainty in the NPV if the invention is saleable independent of further
product development.
III.

THE PATENT SYSTEM AS INCENTIVE

In granting exclusive rights to an invention for a limited time, the
patent system is meant to increase the expected profit from the invention so as to warrant private investment into a risky, costly, and socially beneficial endeavor. 76 Ideally, the system balances the profitenhancing exclusive rights against the probability of success, the cost
of inventing, and the risk of investment; thereby creating an NPV sufficient to act as incentive to the inventor, but not so great as to impose
undue social costs.
A.

ConstitutionalFoundation

Unique among the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress, the Intellectual Property clause states both its purpose-"[t]o
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"-and the means by
which to achieve its purpose- "by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. ' '7 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Intellectual
Property (IP) clause to both empower and limit the government.7 8
Congress has the authority to grant exclusive rights to authors and
inventors in the form of copyrights and patents, but only for the purpose of promoting the progress of science (knowledge) and the useful
arts (technology), respectively.7 9
75. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 298-99, 360.
76. See generally, Arrow, supra note 9 (discussing the economics of investment
resource allocation under uncertainty).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
78. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also, Dotan Olier, Making
Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on
Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006) (arguing the Framers
intended the Progress Clause as a limitation on Congress's intellectual property
power).
79. Pollack, supra note 3, at 756.
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Because patent laws are positive in nature, i.e., they are not a legislative recognition of a natural right to the exclusive ownership of the
fruit of one's intellect,8" the patent system is meant to serve a specific
governmental purpose.8 1 In Graham v. John Deere, the Supreme
Court held that "innovation, advancement, and things which add to
the sum of useful knowledge" are essential elements of an invention
for it to qualify for a patent; thus, Congress may not enact patent laws
that do not serve the ends of furthering "innovation, advancement or
social benefit."8 2 More recently, in Eldred v. Ashcroft,83 the Court
applied Graham to copyright law and stated that Congress may enact
laws to protect intellectual property only to the extent that those laws
serve to "promote the Progress of Science [and the useful Arts]. 8 4
Although some suggest that the original intent of the IP clause was
to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge and the introduction of
invention to the market (innovation), 85 the most common justifications for intellectual property rights include facilitating invention in
addition to dissemination and innovation.8 6 Thus, the patent laws are
meant to create an incentive to invent, to bring the invention to market, and to disseminate the information embodied in the invention.
Congress and the federal courts have the task of creating a patent
system that promotes the progress of technology-stimulates invention, innovation, and dissemination-for the social good without unduly burdening society. In defending the IP clause of the
Constitution, James Madison stated that assignation to the inventor of
exclusive rights to the invention "fully coincides" with the "public
good., 87 The Court in Graham, analyzing Thomas Jefferson's contribution to the formation of the American patent system, reasoned that
the public benefits from a patent system only if the exclusive rights of
a patent grant are limited to "inventions which would
not be disclosed
'88
or devised but for the inducement of a patent.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court recognize that the search for
profits facilitates invention, innovation, and the dissemination of in80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
See id.
See id. at 6.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
See id. at 212 (citing Graham).
See Pollack, supra note 3 at 755-56 (arguing that "progress" means "spread").
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1 at 4, 6-7, ch. 2 at 6 (2003)
[hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024
(1989).
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 261 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic Reissue,
2003).
88. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966).
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formation.8 9 In Eldred, the Court reiterated its view that the best way
to benefit the public through an inventor's talents is to encourage the
individual effort of the inventor with the potential for personal gain. 90
Granting exclusive and alienable rights to her invention potentially
increases the magnitude and certainty of the inventor's estimate of the
invention's NPV prior to the invention-thus increasing the incentive
to invent. In exchange, the government requires full public disclosure
of the invention. 91
B.

Probability of Success

The first factor in the inventor's estimate of the invention's NPV is
the probability of successfully inventing. This probability is primarily
a function of the inventor's access to information and her ability to
manipulate it in such a way as to create new information. 92 All else
being equal, as the probability of success increases, so too does the
NPV. As the NPV increases, there is less need for government-created incentive to develop the product, although there may still be a
need to encourage dissemination of the created information.
The relationship between the inventor's uncertainty and the need
for incentive is recognized in the patent system's requirement that an
invention be novel 93 and nonobvious 94 to qualify for patent protection. There is no need to create and disseminate, through invention
and disclosure, information that already exists in the public domain.
Similarly, there is no need to add incentive to create and disseminate
information that can be readily derived from existing information
through application of ordinary skills.
The probability of successfully "creating" information through invention is 100% if that information is openly available. If the information embodied in the invention is already in the public domain,
through prior disclosure or open use of the invention, the invention is
not novel.9 5 For prior use of the invention to destroy novelty, the information contained in the invention must be readily ascertainable to
the public through the use.96 Because there is no need to encourage
creation or dissemination of information that has already been created
and disseminated, an invention that is not novel does not qualify for
patent protection.
89. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein,

347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
90. See id.

91. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
92. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 997.

93.
94.
95.
96.

§ 102 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
§ 103 (2000).
See § 102(a), (e).
Gaylor v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 496-97 (1850).
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If the created information is an obvious extension of information in
the public domain, the probability of successfully creating information
through invention is 100%, or at least quite high. An invention is obwould
vious if at the time of its formation, the created information
97
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Post-success, determining whether an invention was obvious when created is
quite difficult. Obviousness is a function of several factors: (1) the
level of ordinary skill in the art; (2) the scope and content of the prior
art; (3) the differences between the invention and the prior art; and
(4) factors such as a then long-existing and unfulfilled need satisfied
by the invention. 98 In these so-called Graham-factors,the prior art
consists of the legally available information (i.e., not concealed information), regardless of whether it was known to the inventor, or even
the general public, at the time of the invention.99
The patent system proactively attempts to increase the probability
of success for product development by requiring the patent application to fully disclose the technology utilized in the invention.100 Specifically, the disclosure must be such that a person having ordinary
skill in the relevant art will be able to practice the invention without
undue experimentation." 1 The public may easily access published
patent applications 102-which means increased access to information
for prospective inventors, and therefore increased probability of successfully developing the product.
The prospective probability of success is not the subjective determination of the inventor, but rather the subjective determination of one
who has ordinary skill in the art and access to the relevant and legally
available information. In requiring patent applicants to fully disclose
the invention to the public, the patent system increases the ease with
which one can find the relevant information. Thus, the patent system
adds incentive to undertake the creation of new information and, at
the same time, recognizes that there is no incentive needed when the
information already exists in the public domain or is certain to exist in
the public domain within a reasonable time.
C. Expected Profits

The second factor in the inventor's prospective valuation of the invention is the expected profit from a successful invention. This expected profit is primarily a function of market conditions-all else
97. See § 103(a).
98. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
99. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 254-56 (1965).
100. See § 112.
101. See id.; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
102. See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page
Image Databases, http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007);
Free Patents Online, Patent Searching Database, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/
search.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
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being equal, the greater the inventor's control of the market, the
greater should be her expected profits. Thus, the government can create incentive to invent by granting the inventor, or her assigns, the
right to invoke the powers of government to raise a barrier to market
competition.
This barrier to competition takes the form of an alienable grant of
the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention"-a patent. 10 3 Because the right to exclude extends to equivalents of the invention but not to substitutes for the
invention, the patent owner's control of the market is imperfect-i.e.,
a patent does not necessarily create a monopoly.1" 4 Information that
is only insubstantially different from that embodied in the invention is
considered the equivalent of the invention. °5 A substitute is a product that serves the same market as the invention but does so in a different way (e.g., cable television is a substitute for satellite
television)106
The patent owner's right to exclude is enforced by the ability to
exact a cost on those who violate the right-those who infringe the
patent. 10 7 Whether there is infringement, and the appropriate cost required to deter infringement, are determined in a civil action brought
by the patent owner.1 0 8 The cost exacted may be in the form of damages, 10 9 or it may be in the form of a court injunction on further

infringement.'

10

The damages are calculated to place the patent owner in the same
financial position as she would have been had the infringement not
occurred. 1 If the patent owner actively competed in the market with
the infringer, restitution may amount to the profits lost because of the
infringement. 12 Alternately, and minimally, 3 the restitution may
103. See § 154(a)(1).

104. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950).
105. Id. at 608-10.
106. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 1999); see also GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 10, at 470 (defining a
substitute for the invention as a product for which the demand will rise as the price of
the invention rises).
107. See §§ 271, 281 (2000 & Supp. 2005).

108. § 281.
109. § 284 (2000).
110. § 283.
111. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964).
112. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (holding that lost profits include lost sales on unpatented items that, with the
patented item form a "single functioning unit"); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v.
Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing jury award of lost
profits attributable to sales by infringer).
113. § 284 (stating that the minimum compensation for infringement is a reasonable royalty).
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amount to the royalty the infringer and patent owner, prior to the
infringement, would have negotiated to license the invention.1 14
A court grants an injunction according to the "principles of eq'
uity."115
To justify an equitable grant of injunction, courts require

that: (1) the continued infringement will cause irreparable harm to the
patent owner; (2) the available legal remedies are not adequate to
compensate the patent owner; (3) the patent owner will suffer more
harm from the continuing infringement than would the infringer from
an injunction; and
(4) the "public interest would not be disserved" by
1 16

the injunction.
Because the responsibility of enforcing patent rights falls to the patent owner, she bears the cost of detecting and discouraging infringement-costs that are exacerbated by the disclosure requirements of
patent qualification." 7 In disclosing the created information for
which patent protection is sought, 18 the inventor reduces the initial
cost of infringement and increases the need to police the market for
infringement. 1 9
Along with the potential for increased policing costs associated with
disclosure is the potential for decreased profits. The disclosed information may reduce the cost of a competitor's invention of a substitute,
thereby reducing the patent owner's control over the market by lowering the barrier to competitive entry.1 20 As the scope of the patent
protection increases, the more difficult it is to create a non-equivalent
product and the
less the disclosure eases market entry with a competi1 21
tive substitute.
The patent owner's ability to exact a cost on competitors entering
the market with an equivalent to the invention gives the patent owner
a certain control over the market for the patent's duration. As the
cost she can exact on infringing competitors increases, so too does her
control of the market and the greater should be her profits-and the
greater the invention's NPV. Thus, the inventor's incentive to invest
resources into product development having an uncertain result, and to
disseminate any resulting information, is proportional to her ability to
use a patent to keep others from free-riding on her inventive efforts.
114. See Ga-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.

1970).
115. § 283.
116. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
117. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 298-99.
118. See § 122(b) (requiring the inventor to take special steps, such as abandoning
the application or promising not to file for patent protection in a foreign country, to
avoid publication within 18 months of filing).
119. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 298-99.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 299.
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D.

Cost

The incentive condition requires that the NPV be sufficiently large
to warrant the risk of invention. 122 Because the patent system increases the availability of information through public disclosure requirements, it decreases the cost of information gathering. 123 The
patent system, however, also places restrictions on the use of patented
12 4
information, which increases the cost of information manipulation.
In order to encourage invention and disclosure, the patent system
should not increase costs of inventing disproportionate to the enhanced revenue benefits of patent protection.
E. Risk Aversion
The final factor in determining the incentive to invent is the inventor's aversion to risk. This purely subjective parameter is likely related to the other incentive parameters: the expected cost of the
invention, the probability of failure, and the expected profits. 2 5 Further, the element of uncertainty increases the risk and lowers the incentive for the risk-averse inventor.1 2 6 In order to overcome the
aversion to risk and encourage invention, the patent system should
decrease the level of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is inherent in the estimate of the future invention's
NPV because of the nature of creating new information.1 27 To lessen
the uncertainty in patent law, Congress has established the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to examine and grant patents, 2 8
and it delegated the Federal Circuit as the appellate court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent issues.' 29 The prosecution procedure of
the USPTO fosters certainty that granted patents have satisfied the
statutory requirements, a certainty that takes the form of a presumption of patent validity rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.13 0 The Federal Circuit further fosters certainty by creating or
clarifying rules of law to be followed by the various district courts. 3 1
122. Supra Section II.D.
123. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 298-99.
124. See id.
125. Supra Section II.D.
126. Id.
127. Arrow, supra note 9, at 610-14.
128. 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2000) (establishing the USPTO).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000); Emmette F. Hale, III, The "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238-39 (1986).
130. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
131. Donald R. Dunner, A Retrospective of the FederalCircuit's First 25 Years, IPL
NEWSL. (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law), Summer 2007, at 1, 10; see Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders PatentDecisions Irrational,67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1391, 1395 (2006) [hereinafter Patently Non-Obvious 1].

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

17

TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.
14 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 6
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Two important aspects of patent law that are prone to uncertainty are:
(1) whether the claimed invention is an obvious extension of the prior
art; and (2) what damages are available for continued infringement.
Perhaps the major uncertainty of a post-grant obviousness determination is the difficulty in determining, after success, the prospective
probability of success at the decision to invent. 132 To deal with the
dangers of this so-called hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit has explicitly required some motivation to combine information existing in the
prior art references (relevant documents) before such references imply obviousness"' and has emphasized the importance of commercial
success as an indicator of nonobviousness.13 4 The motivation to combine the separately disclosed information as in the new invention may
be explicitly disclosed in the references or may arise from "common
knowledge, the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem"
sought to be addressed by the invention.' 3 5 Establishing a motivation,
based on information within the common knowledge of one with ordinary skill in the art, is evidentiary rather than legal-the common
within must be established by evidence
knowledge and the motive
136
rather than assumption.
A major uncertainty in the calculation of prospective profits is the
patent owner's ability to raise barriers to market entry. Until recently, 1 37 in recognition that the right to bar a competitor's entry into
the market has a significant impact on the valuation of the invention, a
court was likely to grant an injunction except in exceptional circumstances regarding public welfare-equity was presumed to favor the
patent owner. 1 38 This long-standing presumption was explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,139
and the availability of injunctive relief-and thus the NPV of the prospective invention-is now less certain.
132. See Patently Non-Obvious I, supra note 131, at 1395; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the HindsightIssue Before the Supreme
Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-5 (2007), available at
www.yjolt.org/9/fall/mandel-1.
133. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464
F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
134. See Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Commercial success is an indication of nonobviousness that must be considered in a
patentability analysis."); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Objective [indicia] such as commercial success ... must
be considered before a conclusion on obviousness is reached ... .
135. See DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1361.
136. See id. at 1366-67.
137. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (holding
that there is not a categorical rule to grant an injunction once infringement has been
established).
138. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
139. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
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IV.

THE PATENT SYSTEM AS A BURDEN

A.

Too Many Patents
1. The Problem

A common critique of the current patent system is that it actually
serves to impede invention and innovation by granting patents on incremental improvements or obvious inventions.1 4 ° The resultant "patent thicket" impedes use of the patented information either in the
inventive process or in generating revenue from an invention that is
inextricably linked to other patented information.' 4 1 By shifting resources to patent-related transaction costs, the resources available to
spend on invention are less.1 42 The incentive to invent is lessened by
the increased costs of inventing around prior patents and the lower
expected profits due to licensing or litigation costs.
Many inventors engage in the practice of defensive or offensive patenting.14 3 Several patents that claim protection for a narrow range of
information can be collectively and offensively used to keep a competitor from improving on his invention without licensing (patent clustering) or to block competitors from entering the market through
improvements on the original invention (patent blanketing). 144 Patent
blanketing can also be used defensively against patent clustering, ensuring that the original inventor retains the right to improve his invention.1 4 5 Low standards for patentability encourage such strategic
behavior, which diverts resources
from invention and raises cost barri1 46
ers to inventive activity.
The disincentive created by strategic patenting is said to be accentuated in technological areas that are rapidly advancing. 147 Proponents
of this theory argue that at any instance in time, the state of these arts
is not well documented, existing predominantly
in the common knowl4
edge of the practitioners of the art.' 1
140. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, Executive Summary at 5-7 (2003).
141. See id. ch. 2 at 25-33.
142. See Brief of Intel Corp. and Micron Technology Inc., as Amici Curiae in Sup-

port of Petitioner at 5, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 041350).
143. See KNIGHT, supra note 42, at 48-53; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at
320-22.
144. See KNIGHT, supra note 42, at 48-53; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at
320-22.
145. See KNIGHT, supra note 42, at 48-53; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at

320-22.
146. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, Executive Summary at 5-7 (potential
liability and costs of patent avoidance is enough to keep some inventors from engaging in particular avenues of research); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 320-21.
147. See Brief for Amici Curiae Time Warner Inc., IAC / Interactive Corp., and
Viacom, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 4, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.

1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350).
148. See id. at 4-5.
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2. The Reform
Two suggested reforms for a patent system criticized for allowing
too many patents on marginal advances are: (1) apply a more stringent test of nonobviousness' 49 and (2) ease the burden of proving a
patent invalid.' 5 ° One focus of the obviousness reform is to lessen the
deference that the Federal Circuit gives to commercial success in determining whether an invention is an obvious extension of the prior
art; and, at trial, to switch the burden of proving a relationship (or
lack thereof) between commercial success and obviousness from the
patent opponent to the patent proponent."' The other focus is to alter or overturn the Federal Circuit's motivation test to more readily
find a combination of information disclosed in prior art references obvious because of the abilities of ordinary practitioners of the art to
create and manipulate information.' 52 Related to the reform of obviousness is the push to lower the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity by allowing an invalidation of a patent by a
preponderance of the evidence rather than the current clear-and-convincing standard.' 53
In KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court adopted a more
subjective test for obviousness than the Federal Circuit's motivation
test. 1 54 The Court, in ruling on the obviousness of an invention that
consists of a combination of prior-art elements, noted that the "inferences" and "creative steps" that an ordinary practitioner of the art
would make can render a combination of existing elements obvious.155
Stating that an ordinary practitioner is "a person of ordinary creativity," the Court went on to note that a combination may be obvious if
market forces or design needs motivate the ordinary practitioner to
try combining existing elements.1 56 The only limit on this obviousness
analysis seems to be that there be a finite number of combinations
(i.e., not an infinite number of combinations) and that the results of
the combination be predictable. 57
Applying a more subjective test than the Federal Circuit's motivation test likely will increase the risk of hindsight bias and thus the
uncertainty in the estimate of the prospective invention's NPV. Examining the ordinary artisan's knowledge and ability to create information is a subjective inquiry that will come well after the invention is
149. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, ch. 4 at 8-19.
150. See id. ch. 5 at 28.
151. See id. ch. 4 at 19.
152. See, e.g., id.; Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No.
04-1350).
153. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, ch. 5 at 28.
154. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742-43 (2007).
155. Id. at 1741.
156. Id. at 1742.
157. See id.
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complete and the knowledge disseminated. Such a subjective test will
expose investors to greater risks and thus decrease their incentive to
invest into invention. Although the subjective test may decrease the
cost of obvious incremental invention, and thus increase the availability of products while lowering consumer costs, it may also decrease
the incentive to invest in non-incremental activities for fear that any
inventions will later be deemed incremental.
The inventive stages of product development involve both the creation of product concept and the recognition of the market need for the
product. The proposed obviousness standard (partially adopted in
KSR Int'l Co.) incorrectly excludes the recognition of need from the
inventive process. Recognizing and defining the market need (identifying the problem to be solved) is an essential first step in the process
of creating the product concept (solving the problem). Refusing to
consider commercial success as an indicator of nonobviousness assumes the problem-searching step and thus reduces the incentive to
search for problems to be solved, ultimately reducing the incentive to
invent.
The obviousness issue as it applies to rapidly advancing technology
might be solved with increased publication of the relevant information, increasing the dissemination of knowledge outside the circle of
practitioners of what may be an esoteric art. Acquiring patent protection or ensuring that another may not acquire patent protection may
provide an incentive to disseminate.15 8 While the short-run ramifications may be the increased costs of dissemination, the long-run benefits include a broader base of information accessible to the publicenabling more and greater invention in the future.
B.

Too Powerful Patents
1. The Problem

A common critique of the current patent system is that it actually
serves to impede invention and innovation by creating remedies to
infringement disproportionate to the value that the patented product
adds to an infringing device. 1 59 An extension of this critique is that
the value of the patent is enhanced disproportionately to the value of
the invention to society and that certain remedies may impose an unbearable social cost. 160 There are two common threads to the critique
158. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (defining the statutory invention registration
publication which grants the defensive powers of a patent (as prior art) but not its
offensive powers (right to exclude)).
159. See, e.g., Brief of Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 6-12, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130) [hereinafter Software Alliance].
160. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Malla Pollack and Other Legal Scholars Supporting
eBay Inc. et al., at 4, 9-11, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130) [hereinafter Legal Scholars].
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of the power of patents: (1) the availability of enhanced damages or
injunctive relief creates a disparity in negotiating positions of the patent holder and potential licensee-making an arm's-length agreement
is inappropriate when it removes
unlikely;' 6 ' and (2) injunctive relief
1 62
market.
the
from
the invention
2.

The Reform

Two suggested reforms for a patent system said to give too much
power to patent owners, particularly non-practicing patent holders,
are to: (1) lower the available damages 1 63 and (2) make specific remedies contingent upon whether the party asserting the patent practices
the disclosed invention. 1 64 One policy goal of this reform is to encourage inventors and developers to search patent publications and
make use of the prior art without exposing themselves to enhanced
damages for willful infringement, a remedy that would then require
deliberate copying of the protected invention instead of the current
knowledge-of-the-patent standard. 6 ' Another policy goal of this proposed reform is to protect, or establish, a public right to the technolimiting the
logical advances that embody the patented information by
166
availability of an injunction of further infringing action.
While the issue of enhanced damages has yet to be addressed, the
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of injunction awards-to some
degree. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court overruled
the Federal Circuit's rule that injunctions would be granted barring a
showing of exceptional circumstances related to public welfare. 1 67 Arguing that the traditional four-factor equity test was to apply without
presumption, the Court did not explicitly create a presumption against
non-practicing patent owners. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, however, stated that legal remedies "may well be sufficient" for non-pracwho use the threat of injunction to maximize
ticing patent owners
1 68
fees.
licensing
Since the eBay decision, district courts applying the four-factor equity test have routinely denied injunctive relief to non-practicing or
161. See, e.g., Software Alliance, supra note 159, at 8-9.
162. See e.g., Legal Scholars, supra note 160, at 17-20.
163. See, e.g., S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (amending Title 35's provisions regarding remedies for infringement); H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (amending Title 35's provisions regarding the inventor's right to obtain damages).
164. See, e.g., Legal Scholars, supra note 160, at 17-20.
165. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, ch. 5 at 30-31.
166. See Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
36-37 (2005) (statement of Daniel B. Ravicher, Executive Director, Public Patent
Foundation).
167. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
168. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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non-competing patent owners. 169 For example, the district court in z4
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.170 reasoned that there was no
threat of irreparable harm to the patent holder by Microsoft's continued, willful infringement because z4 and Microsoft were not competing for the same market.1 71 Similarly, the district court in Paice LLC
v. Toyota Motor Corp.172 refused to enjoin Toyota from further infringement because Paice did not compete with Toyota in the market
where infringement was occurring and because Paice failed to prove
that its efforts173 to license its invention were hampered by Toyota's
infringement.
In effect, eBay seems to require that where a third party is willing to
practice the invention, the patent owner must: (1) license it; (2) accept
infringement; (3) bear the cost of litigation to determine a reasonable
royalty (and risk patent invalidation); or (4) enter the market by practicing the invention in competition with any potential infringers.
Because of the uncertainty in litigation, the inventor's position in
license negotiations is weaker under eBay than it was under the presumptive-injunction jurisprudence; thus, eBay has reduced the NPV of
the prospective invention-as-the-product. Because the market value
for licensing has been reduced, the incentive for those who are unwilling or unable to produce and market a fully developed product is also
reduced. Investors contemplating a product development now must
proceed based on a lower NPV of invention licensing, or assume the
increased risks of a full product development.
The NPV of the prospective invention is reduced if enhanced damages are less readily available. Since exacting a cost in the form of
damages for infringement is the primary mode by which the patent
holder may raise barriers to market entry, the patent holder's control
of the market and his expected profit are reduced by lower available
damages.
Further, the prospective cost and the associated uncertainty for invention and innovation combined are greater than for invention
alone. The increased cost, decreased expected profits, and increased
uncertainty all serve to lower the incentive to invest into invention.
Since the uncertainty of the innovation stages may be less for investors with a strong production capability and market presence (such as
Microsoft and Toyota), the eBay ruling will disproportionately affect
start-ups and invention-only firms.
169. See Jonathan Muenkal & Eric Lee, The eBay Effect: Real Change or Status
Quo? An Examination of Requests for Injunctive Relief in PatentActions Since eBay v.
MercExchange, 25 IPL NEWSL (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law), Fall 2006,
at 14, 20.
170. z4 Techs., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
171. Id. at 440.
172. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
173. Id. at *14.
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As described in Section II.B, supra, the cost of inventing is the lost
opportunity to use those resources in some other way (the next best
use). The expectation of recouping actual costs is not a sufficient incentive to invest; there must be enough expected return on investment
to warrant the cost of invention over some other investment. Similarly, as described in Section II.D, supra, the incentive to invest decreases as the risk increases; there must be enough expected return on
investment to warrant the risk. Reducing the availability of enhanced
damages lowers the expected profits from the invention, and reducing
the availability of injunction lowers both the expected profits and increases the uncertainty in the NPV estimate. These changes to available remedies for infringement have both increased the risk and
decreased the NPV, thus doubly decreasing the incentive to invest
into invention.
Because of lower infringement costs, those in a better position to
bring the invention to market, like Microsoft or Toyota, will now be
able to do so at a lower immediate cost to the consumer. However,
this short-run benefit may be at the expense of the long-run cost of a
reduced overall investment into invention.
V.

CONCLUSION

The push for reform of the U.S. patent system may be placing shortrun economic benefits, in the form of reduced cost and increased
availability of current technology, over the long-run benefits from a
constant source of new and useful technology.
In its attempt to replace the evidentiary standard of the Federal Circuit's motivation test, the patent-reform lobby argues that granting
fewer patents will reduce product development costs. They argue that
many inventions for which patents are granted are merely obvious extensions of the body of knowledge and skill common to ordinary practitioners of the particular art; that restrictions on use of the invention
impede technological process and consumer access to such technology. 174 The patent-reform lobby fails to acknowledge the effect of
certainty granted by the motivation test on an investor's incentive to
invent. Nor does it acknowledge that the motivation test acts as incentive to defensively publish technical information-one of the goals
of the patent system. Moving to a less certain measure of obviousness
increases the risk of investment and therefore reduces the incentive to
invent. Reduced incentive to invent will reduce the number of investors willing to assume the risk of invention.
In its attempt to limit the availability of injunction and enhanced
damages, the patent-reform lobby argues that restricting the remedies
available to an infringed-patent owner will reduce the infringer's de174. See supra Section IV.A.1.
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velopment costs.1 75 The infringer's reduced development costs may
result in reduced consumer costs or in increased infringer profits. Reducing the patent owner's available remedies lowers his ability to control the market, thus reducing the expected revenues from the
invention and the estimated NPV of the prospective invention. Reducing available remedies decreases the expected return on investment and therefore reduces the incentive to invent. Reduced
incentive to invent will lower the number of investors willing to assume the risk of invention.
While the patent-reform lobby argues that the patent system is
functioning contrary to its purpose, the suggested reforms seem aimed
at reducing innovation costs at the expense of the incentive to invent.
These reforms would likely have the effect of lower short-run costs to
the consumer for products based on existing technology, but perhaps
at the expense of reduced incentive to create products based on yetto-be-developed technology. This raises the question: What will the
next generation of law students use to write papers on then-existing
patent-law crises? Perhaps a thought-to-print product, or merely a
lower-cost version of the 2006-era computer and software?
Don Tiller
175. See supra Section IV.B.1.
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